A Weakened Iran Is Still A Strategic Win

Toppling the regime is unlikely, but degrading Iran's power and restoring deterrence advances U.S. interests—and keeps options open if Iranians rise against their rulers.

More than a week into military operations against Iran there are no signs the Iranian people are ready to rise and replace their government. The hopeful moment in January when large numbers of Iranians were on the streets has passed. A mass uprising in the aftermath of the current conflict is possible, but the brutality of Iran's leaders seems to have once again suppressed the will of the Iranian people. At least seven thousand Iranians were gunned down during the January unrest, a clear commitment by the regime to maintain its power no matter the human cost.

There are two separate conversations that need to occur concerning the ongoing operations in Iran. It's important they remain separate for the clarity of both. The first is a political conversation about the competency and truthfulness of the Trump administration. The second is a strategic discussion about what's been accomplished by our recent military actions and how we should think about Iran in the future. It's possible to conclude that the Trump administration mistimed its actions, miscalculated likely outcomes and wasn't transparent with the American people and still support its recent military actions against Iran. The administration may have stumbled its way to the right decision for the wrong reasons.

As the American people begin to adjudicate the performance of President Trump and his administration, it's important not to lose focus on the opportunities at hand. The Trump administration hasn't clearly communicated its aims, but most officials now seem ready to accept a continuation of the regime and the accomplishment of more limited goals. As we look forward to the post-conflict period, it's important not to be discouraged or dissuaded from future action, even as we remain humble about our capabilities and careful in our analysis.

U.S. and Israeli military actions have seriously degraded Iran's ability to project power in the region and further damaged its nuclear program. These are worthwhile accomplishments in their own right but less important than the restoration of American deterrence that's been facilitated by our ongoing actions. In future negotiations, Iran will now need to consider the possibility of major military action, something it probably saw as unlikely until the beginning of the current conflict.

Iran understands how the credible threat of force can strengthen negotiating positions. It's why the country has invested so heavily in the ability to threaten its neighbors, disrupt global trade and remain on the path toward a nuclear weapon. These Iranian efforts are only useful, however, if Iran's adversaries believe the country is willing to employ its offensive capabilities. This is one reason why Iran chose to broaden the conflict by attacking its neighbors. Until recently it wasn't clear that the Iranian regime was willing to employ its drones and missiles against civilian targets and critical infrastructure in neighboring countries that weren't involved in attacking Iran. Iran's targeting of neighboring countries is a way for the country to establish the credibility of its deterrence. It wants the U.S. and Israel to know what it's capable of in the event of future hostilities. Making enemies of the Gulf states may not ultimately work to Iran's advantage but does alter our risk analysis of a future conflict.

Just like Iranian deterrence, American deterrence is only possible if Iran believes the U.S. is willing to employ its power. Our recent actions have restored credibility to American deterrence, and this change will exert a positive influence on our negotiating position in the future. The Iranian regime now needs to think twice about challenging the U.S. or risk repeating the current military punishment.

Barring a dramatic change to the situation in Iran, ending the conflict will require the U.S. to enter negotiations with the current regime. When we do, our demands can't be maximalist and can't involve regime surrender. They can, however, leverage Iran's current weakness to try to extract meaningful concessions on its nuclear program and set limits on the number and capabilities of its ballistic missiles. They can also try to lessen the support Iran provides to regional proxies.

Iran is certain to resist these concessions but its government is aware of its tenuous domestic support and understands that military confrontations are inherently unpredictable. It may agree to terms that weren't acceptable before the current conflict. Even if the U.S. can't extract deep concessions, military operations are achieving many of the same goals. Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear programs will be constrained by heavy losses suffered during the current campaign.

The challenges presented by Iran are no different than most problems in foreign policy which are managed rather than solved. The damage being inflicted on the country makes managing the problem easier. Iran's regime may survive the current operation, but its focus will be on internal reconstruction rather than foreign adventures, at least for a time. If the Iranian regime chooses a different path and neglects domestic concerns for the sake of rebuilding its missile program and rearming its proxies, it won't be long before Iran's people return to the streets to demand a better life. When they do, the U.S. will have another opportunity to support Iranians as they demand an end to the current regime.

The best time for the U.S. to have acted in Iran was at the height of the recent protests when tens of thousands of Iranians were on the streets protesting the regime. Because so much of our naval power was concentrated in the Caribbean, we weren't prepared for decisive action in the Middle East. Even with the limited combat power then available, it would have made sense to act in January rather than wait for additional offensive forces to arrive. Convincing people to take to the streets and oppose a repressive government is hard and it makes sense to support people when they're already there.

The U.S. would be making a mistake if we convinced ourselves to categorically avoid future military interventions in Iran. If public opinion, the Democratic Party, or the isolationist MAGA base of the Republican Party convinces Iran that the U.S. lacks the will to act, we'll squander the credibility we've gained.

Iran's regime is unlikely to ever become a productive and peaceful player in world affairs and equally unlikely to ever surrender power except under extreme pressure.

Determined action by Iran's people, even in the face of severe repression, will one day be required to finally end the Iranian regime. When our analysis shows these actions have a chance to succeed the U.S. must be prepared to act in support of the Iranian people. There will always be serious risks associated with the collapse of Iran's regime but also serious risks if the regime continues indefinitely into the future.

Maintaining American deterrence and containing Iran's capabilities will never be cost free. The seven service members who lost their lives in the current conflict illustrate the human cost of our action. Each of them has heartbroken families that will never be the same again. The bombing of a school in Minab in Southern Iran took the lives of innocent children and is another crystal-clear illustration of the terrible costs of conflict. These children were no different than our own and we should feel their loss. These tragedies explain why so many good people want to avoid conflict at any cost. Their impulse is right but their reasoning is flawed. Until conflict disappears from geopolitics, carefully choosing the right moment to act is the better decision than choosing never to act at all.

Colin Pascal is a retired Army lieutenant colonel and senior fellow at the Orion Policy Institute. He served as Chief of Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE and as Director of Operations for the U.S. Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity.