Striking Iran Was Justified But Strategic Mistakes Risk Undermining Success

A limited war can achieve meaningful gains, but only with disciplined strategy and messaging.

It's fair to criticize President Trump's decision to launch military operations against Iran and point out places where his strategy, or lack of a strategy, has failed. What's less useful is to offer these critiques without an alternative theory of how the U.S. could have contained Iran's regional ambitions and its nuclear program. Since President Obama agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, the U.S. has been managing the Iranian problem rather than trying to solve it, and this has generally been the right approach.

The JCPOA was heavily criticized by conservatives in the U.S. as well as by the Israeli government for its limited duration. The agreement only placed limits on Iran's nuclear enrichment for a period of fifteen years. Obama took the best deal he thought was attainable. The only other option then available was probably the type of military operation that's now underway.

Unless something unexpected happens, it seems unlikely that the Iranian people will confront their government with enough force to overthrow their regime. The most likely time for this to have happened was at the height of protests in January when tens of thousands of Iranians were threating their regime. It took the killing of more than 7,000 Iranian citizens, most of whom were gunned down in the streets, for the government to suppress the discontent and reassert control. Had the U.S. been able to act we might have altered the outcome by targeting regime forces before they could intimidate and murder their people.

At the time, a significant amount of combat power was deployed to the Caribbean in keeping with the focus on the Western Hemisphere directed by the president's national security strategy. America's military resources aren't unlimited, and we weren't well positioned to support the protestors as they were beaten back with violence.

Even though our timing was off, military action against Iran can accomplish more than the JCPOA sought to achieve. Even if the current conflict doesn't force an Iranian agreement to curtail its ballistic missile program, the damage being done to that program is significant. Iran is being forced to deplete its stocks while the destruction of Iranian industrial capacity will make it difficult for the country to quickly reconstitute its forces. Russia may try to help, another reminder of how that country consistently works against U.S. interests, but Moscow's ability to redirect resources to Iran is limited by its war against Ukraine. By tying up Russian forces and resources, the Ukrainians will make it difficult for Russia to provide significant military aid.

The president has made two key errors that are important to identify so they can be addressed by a change in our government's policy. The first was describing the conflict as nothing more than a "little excursion." This description not only fails to give credit to the men and women of our armed forces who are taking on an immense challenge, it creates pressure on the president to end the war quickly. By telling the American people that operations against Iran are easy, the president is creating the expectation that these operations will soon end.

Responding to the pressure created by this expectation, both the president and Secretary of State Marco Rubio made the second key error when they explicitly committed to an operational timeline. The president has said repeatedly that the conflict will be over "soon," and Secretary Rubio has put the end of the war at no longer than two to four weeks. This was an error and gives the Iranians a clear indication of how long they need to maintain the fight, allowing them to calculate their rate of missile fire and make other assessments that are useful to their regime. It's never good for an enemy to know how long we plan to fight and President Obama was widely criticized when he surged forces to Afghanistan and gave a date for their withdrawal before they had even arrived. Obama gave an end date because he knew public opinion would demand it, and that's exactly the situation the Trump administration has recreated by telling the American people the war against Iran would be easy and relatively cost free.

It's important as we move closer to negotiations that we're realistic about outcomes. This means accepting the view that Iran is a problem to be managed rather than solved. If Iran's nuclear program is severely curtailed, its government has fewer resources for foreign adventures, and its ballistic missile forces and navy are significantly degraded, the current conflict will be a success. If we insist on full compliance with the 15 points outlined in President Trump's peace proposal, Iran will refuse, and we'll be forced to escalate the conflict into one that involves ground forces. The president understands the power of a maximalist opening negotiating position but deciding exactly what we're willing to accept as minimum concessions is equally important. These shouldn't be shared publicly but should be well understood by the president and his team.

Striking Iran changed the course of history, and maybe for the better, because the situation before the conflict was unacceptable. This doesn't mean the president's rhetoric hasn't been strategically unhelpful and, in some cases, morally wrong. The U.S. doesn't bomb people for fun. Even though Iran is exerting tremendous pressure by closing the Strait of Hormuz, it can't win using this strategy in the long run. Iran earns most of its foreign currency by exporting oil and gas and relies on these exports for 25% of its government revenue. If the U.S. responds to Iran's blockade by striking export facilities on Kharg Island, Iran's battered economy will tip toward collapse.

For everything the president got wrong, his decision to strike Iran has restored credibility to American deterrence and weakened a country that wished us harm. If at the end of this conflict Iran is less able to threaten its neighbors, develop nuclear arms and support Russia's war in Ukraine, then the current conflict was worth the terrible cost. If our goals, however, are unattainable or ambiguous, we risk turning the conflict into a quagmire that takes the lives of additional service members for reasons that don't justify the cost.

Colin Pascal is a retired Army lieutenant colonel and Military Intelligence Officer and a senior fellow at the Orion Policy Institute. He spent 52 months deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.