Winning the War Without Losing the Iranian People

America must think beyond battlefield gains to long-term political success.

Ending the Iran war on terms favorable to the U.S. won't be easy since our negotiating positions remain far apart. Diplomacy alone isn't likely to close the gap, and additional military action, threatened or implemented, is necessary. To be effective, however, this action must be properly targeted. President Trump's plan to attack Iranian power plants and civilian infrastructure is meant to influence the situation in our favor, but carrying out the attacks would create new problems and probably not lead to the surrender or collapse of the Iranian regime. His aggressive rhetoric, meant to achieve the same end, is wrong and counterproductive.

U.S. actions have restored the credibility of military deterrence and severely weakened Iran's armed forces. Regime change seemed like a possibility earlier this year when tens of thousands of Iranians were protesting the government but now seems unlikely. Without a popular uprising, our focus should be on ending the war on the most favorable terms we can achieve in the near term.

The conflict in the Middle East isn't occurring in a vacuum, and the longer it continues the more it benefits the Russians and Chinese. The U.S. is depleting our stock of advanced weapons, and our limited industrial capacity means these weapons can't be quickly replaced even as we prioritize expanded production. This means fewer advanced air defense systems are available to support Ukraine and deter Chinese aggression. The elevated oil prices caused by the conflict, and the temporary suspension of U.S. sanctions against Russia, are cushioning a Russian economy that was under significant strain.

Advocating for an end to the war doesn't mean the initial strikes were unjustified. The situation that existed before the conflict was as difficult and untenable as the challenges we currently face. It's useful for critics of our current policy to share views about what's gone wrong, but important they don't lose sight of the threat posed by Iran's regime. Absent constraint, Iran will continue its clandestine nuclear program and use its nuclear capability as a shield as it works to increase its influence in the Middle East. In the middle of an unpopular conflict, it's hard to imagine the future might have been more dangerous had we chosen not to act. Iran posed real risks that couldn't be ignored or wished away.

U.S. policy makers should transition their mindset from one of solving the Iranian problem through the current war to one of managing the Iranian problem over time. The U.S. should be prepared to support regime change if it's led by the Iranian people, but what we need now is to focus on achieving our most critical aims. This requires us to examine what we're willing to give the Iranians in return for an acceptable settlement.

It's inconceivable that the U.S. would ever pay war reparations, but we might consider allowing the Iranians to earn money by collecting tolls from ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. This can't be allowed to indicate Iranian sovereignty over the strait and would need to be negotiated carefully, but the offer might be a way to meet an Iranian demand in exchange for important concessions of their own. It would also give Iran an incentive to protect the free passage of ships through the Persian Gulf.

Many in the U.S. will balk at the idea of allowing Iran to earn money from ships transiting an international waterway. Unless we're expecting Iran's total and unconditional surrender, however, the fact is we'll need to accept some of Iran's conditions. Conflicts like the Second World War and the American Civil War ended with one side demanding and receiving an unconditional surrender, but these types of victories are much more costly to achieve than negotiated settlements.

The president's attack on Kharg Island was a reasonable escalation of the conflict. The risk to civilians was minimal even as the attacks threatened Iran's long term financial viability and increased pressure on the regime. Attacking power plants and civilian infrastructure will create misery for the Iranian people and undermine our reputation in their eyes. This makes it harder for Iranians to collaborate in the future with the U.S. against the regime and may dampen their enthusiasm to challenge that regime in the first place. If the U.S. follows through on the president's threat to destroy everything in Iran that's meaningful, in the view of the Iranian people America will become a greater threat than their regime.

One day U.S. military power can make a real difference when the Iranian people commit themselves to replacing their government. For any partnership to work Iranians need to respect the U.S. and view Americans in a better light than they view their current rulers. Few Iranians will want to collaborate with a country that's threatening to annihilate their civilization and the president's bombast is making a strong case to Iranians that their government was right about America's malicious intent.

Iran's regime will always prioritize military pursuits over civilian needs. After this conflict is finished, and especially if we damage their ability to export oil and gas, Iran's resources will be limited. The regime is sure to engender new resistance from Iran's people who won't want these resources allocated toward rebuilding the military or to foreign adventures. In this way, the poverty of the Iranian state will sustain the simmering animosity of the Iranian people and encourage their next uprising. On the other hand, if the U.S. becomes the main instrument of Iranian suffering by depriving the country of electricity and standing between Iranians and their basic needs, this simmering animosity will shift away from their government and toward the United States. If our actions cause the Iranians to see the U.S. as the moral equivalent of their regime, they'll be less inclined to replace one by accepting help and encouragement from the other.

The president's coarse and callous language is working against our aims. His decision to mention "Allah" in a disparaging way was beyond distasteful. It was also the perfect way to lose support for America's cause among the Iranian people. It makes no sense to say that we want to partner with Iranians to overthrow their government and then belittle their religion and threaten them with civilizational erasure.

The U.S. needs to remember that we're at war with the Iranian government and not the Iranian people. Those in power are the ones most able to survive any suffering brought on by America's destruction of Iranian infrastructure. They're the ones with control over Iran's money and guns.

America started this war with an appeal to Iran's people to rise and remove their government. We rooted our appeal in the historic significance and hopeful future of Iran. Five weeks into the conflict, we seem much less interested in the well-being of Iranians. Insulting their view of God and threatening to erase their civilization is a poor way to remind them they have our support. The worst outcome of the current conflict would be a long-term break in the relationship between the U.S. and the Iranian people. It's this relationship that one day brings down the Iranian regime and we'd be foolish to squander this long-term victory by bombing too aggressively in pursuit of short-term gain.

Colin Pascal is a retired Army lieutenant colonel and Military Intelligence Officer. He spent 52 months deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and served as Chief of Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence in the Middle East for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE.